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Does Democratic Consolidation Lead to a Decline in Voter Turnout?
Global Evidence Since 1939
FILIP KOSTELKA Universite´ de Montre´al and Sciences Po
This article challenges the conventional wisdom that democratic consolidation depresses voterturnout. Studying democratic legislative elections held worldwide between 1939 and 2015, itexplains why voting rates in new democracies decrease when they do, how much they decrease,
and how this phenomenon relates to the voter decline observed in established democracies. The article
identifies three main sources of decline. The first and most important is the democratization context.
When democratizations are opposition-driven or occur in electorally mobilized dictatorships, voter
turnout is strongly boosted in the founding democratic elections. As time passes and the mobilizing
democratization context loses salience, voting rates return to normal, which translates into turnout
declines. The second source is the democratic consolidation context, which seems to depress voter
turnout only in post-Communist democracies. Finally, new democracies mirror established democra-
cies in that their voting rates have been declining since the 1970s, irrespective of the two previous
mechanisms.
A ccording to conventional wisdom, democraticconsolidation depresses electoral participationbecause by the time democracy is consolidated,
voters have become disillusioned with democracy or
are apathetic in the face of reduced electoral stakes.
This belief receives support from a number of impres-
sive voter turnout declines recorded in newly consoli-
dated democracies all over the globe. To cite just a few
cases, less than 20 years after democratization, voter
turnout fell by 17.5 percentage points (pp) in Portugal
(which has held democratic elections since 1975), 29
pp in El Salvador (1982), 30 pp South Korea (1988),
and 47 pp in Romania (1990). The size and speed of
these declines are unparalleled in established democ-
racies,where turnout tends tofluctuateby anaverageof
3 pp fromone election to another (Blais 2007, 622), and
where it decreased in legislative elections by approxi-
mately 7 pp between the 1960s and late 1990s (Norris
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2002, Chapter 3; Gray and Caul 2000, Footnote 31;
Franklin 2004, 120; Blais 2007, 628).
However, drastic voter turnout decline did not occur
in all new democracies. Interestingly, in some of these
countries, the decreasing dynamic was markedly less
spectacular. For instance, in Spain, which, like neigh-
boring Portugal, experienced a military dictatorship
that lasted several decades before democratizing in
the mid-1970s, turnout decreased by only 2.6 pp: 7
times less than in Portugal. A systematic overview of all
91 democratic consolidations that took place between
1939 and 2015, presented graphically in Figure 1, shows
that, contrary to the usual expectations, a substantial
decline in voter turnout occurred in only one out of
every two democratic consolidations. In fact, voting
rates decreased by less than 5 pp in 16% of cases, and
in 34% of cases they did not decrease at all.
The present article tackles the puzzling variation of
post-democratization voter turnout dynamics. It con-
tributes meaningfully to the political science literature
on voter turnout, elections, and democratization in the
following ways.
The article proposes a new theoretical framework
that outlines the commonalities and differences be-
tween new and established democracies in terms of
voter turnout drivers. It then further elaborates on fac-
tors that are specific to new democracies, which may
account for the exceptionally dramatic shifts in vot-
ing rates that sometimes occur after democratization.
Building on earlier works (Kostadinova 2003; Pacek,
Pop-Eleches, and Tucker 2009), it identifies two pos-
sible causal mechanisms behind steep voting rate de-
clines, which reflect two types of contexts: the democ-
ratization context and the consolidation context.
To test my new theory, the article conducts what I
believe is the most comprehensive empirical analysis
of voter turnout to date, covering most of the legisla-
tive elections held in consolidating and consolidated
democracies between 1939 and 2015.
The results untangle the complexity of voter turnout
dynamics in new democracies. They suggest that,
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FIGURE 1. Total Voter Turnout Change over the First Six Democratic Elections Since 1939
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contrary to conventional expectations, democratic con-
solidation as such does not depress voter turnout.
The spectacular declines of electoral mobilization in
new democracies are largely accounted for by the de-
mocratization context, which in certain circumstances
strongly boosts voter turnout in the founding demo-
cratic elections. This depends essentially on two fac-
tors: the degree of electoral mobilization under the
preceding dictatorship and the country’s democrati-
zation path. For instance, the stark contrast between
Portugal and Spain can be, in large part, attributed to
the fact that the democratization process was mainly
driven by the democratic opposition in Portugal, which
rendered the Portuguese founding election particularly
mobilizing, and by the authoritarian regime in Spain,
which limited the euphoria and stakes in the Spanish
founding election. Furthermore, the turnout-reducing
effect of the democratic consolidation context is em-
pirically supported only in post-Communist democ-
racies. Even in these countries, however, the impact
of the consolidation context is weaker than that of
the democratization context. Hence, whether a dra-
matic decline in voter turnout occurs depends, ceteris
paribus, much more on what happened before and
during the regime change than after it. Furthermore,
when the effects of the democratization and consoli-
dation contexts are accounted for, voter turnout pat-
terns in new democracies display tendencies similar
to those in their established democratic counterparts.
Accordingly, voting rates in new democracies are more
likely to have decreased since the 1970s regardless
of the democratization and democratic consolidation
contexts.
When these findings are put together, they show that
a single occurrence of a voter turnout decline in new
democracies may stem from one to three sources. In
combination, these sources can contribute to particu-
larly sharp drops in electoral participation, such as that
observed in Romania. They also explain why we have
seen so many dramatic declines since the beginning
of the third wave of democratization in 1974: prior
to the third wave, opposition-driven democratizations
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from electorally mobilized dictatorships were rare, no
consolidating democracy had to cope with Commu-
nist legacies, and the global environment was pushing
turnout up in all democracies.
ELECTORAL PARTICIPATION AND THE
PROCESSES OF DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION
AND CONSOLIDATION
In the political science literature on voter turnout in
newdemocracies, democratic consolidation is not often
explicitly distinguished from democratization. How-
ever, this distinction is crucial for the theoretical devel-
opments that follow. Therefore, in the rest of the arti-
cle, “democratization” (a phrase I use interchangeably
with “democratic transition”) refers to the processes
through which an authoritarian regime gives way to
a democratic alternative. It ends after the first (i.e.,
founding) democratic election, when a democratically
elected government takes over (Linz and Stepan 1996,
3). Democratic consolidation describes the “habitua-
tion phase” (Rustow 1970, 358) that follows democra-
tization. It is a process duringwhich thenewdemocratic
rules of the game become progressively routinized
and embraced by the relevant political actors. Demo-
cratic consolidation reduces the chances of democratic
reversal and ends—that is, democracies are consoli-
dated (or established)—when the chance of reversal
is very low and is no longer decreasing significantly
(Gasiorowski and Power 1998). I therefore adhere to
the “prospective” approach to democratic consolida-
tion (Svolik 2015). Since the probability of democratic
breakdown is significantly reduced by the end of the
second democratic decade (Svolik 2008; 2015), in this
study, democracies cease to qualify as “consolidating”
(i.e., “new”) after six democratic elections. This gener-
ally corresponds to 20 years of democratic politics.1
Having clarified the key terms, what is the impact
of democratization and democratic consolidation on
electoral participation? Most authors, with a few rare
exceptions (Turner 1993; Norris 2002; see below),2
concur that the latter typically reaches its peak in an
early stage of democratization and then decreases over
time in the consolidation stage (O’Donnell, Schmit-
ter, and Whitehead 1986, 62; Kostadinova 2003; Rose
and Munro 2003, 26; Fornos, Power, and Garand 2004;
Kostadinova and Power 2007; Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and
Tucker 2009). Two different but largely compatible the-
oretical explanations can account for this pattern (see
also Hughes and Guerrero 2009, 355).
The so-called “stakes-based” hypothesis of electoral
turnout (notably Pacek, Pop-Eleches, andTucker 2009)
relies ona straightforward claim that peopleparticipate
when it matters most. Electoral participation matters
the most at the beginning of a transition (i.e., when the
1 In my dataset, the 6-election cycle corresponds, on average, to
18.3 years.
2 Another exception is Herron (2009, 73). However, as his dataset
contains only former Soviet Republics, the majority of which are
partial or full autocracies, his findings are of little relevance to my
research question.
authoritarian regime is breaking down), because the
form of the new political regime has yet to be decided.
In contrast, once the new (democratic) regime is in
place, the stakes are no longer as high. The nature of
the main political issues usually ceases to be constitu-
tional (or constitution-like), which kicks off the start of
less-mobilizing, business-as-usual politics. This, in turn,
translates into lower turnout levels.
The “disenchantment” hypothesis (Kostadinova
2003; Kostadinova and Power 2007), in contrast, views
high initial electoral participation rates as the result
of generalized enthusiasm and citizens’ unrealistically
raised expectations for the newdemocratic regime. The
subsequent decline in voter turnout is then due to a
democratic disenchantment caused by the confronta-
tionwith “real” democratic political life, in whichmany
of citizens’ expectations are not—and cannot–be met.
In the context of new democracies, this disenchant-
ment has been given different names: “El desencanto”
(“disillusion” in Spanish,Huntington 1991, 254), “post-
totalitarian blues” (Rupnik 1996), “euphoria-deflation
effect” (McDonough et al. 1998, 21), and “post-
honeymoon effect” (Inglehart and Catterberg 2002, 9).
The practical implication of the twohypotheses is the
same. Whatever the democratization context, demo-
cratic consolidation—understood as a process, not a
final state—will always tend to decrease electoral par-
ticipation. From an empirical perspective, this claim
is supported by a number of qualitative case studies
(Lehoucq and Wall 2004; Carlin 2006; Hughes and
Guerrero 2009). However, in comparative terms, this
claim was tested on a rather limited number of third-
wave (i.e., post-1974) democratizers, namely select
countries in either the post-Communist region (Rose
and Munro 2003, 26; Kostadinova 2003; Pacek, Pop-
Eleches, and Tucker 2009), Latin America (Fornos,
Power, and Garand 2004), or in both (Kostadinova
and Power 2007). Interestingly, the findings of the only
two studies with more diverse case selection questions
the inevitability of the post-democratization decline
in voter turnout. In his 1993 article, Arthur Turner
compares voter turnout dynamics in amix of pre-third-
wave and third-wave democracies and concludes that
“despite common expectations to the contrary, turnout
in [ . . . ] [founding] parliamentary elections is lower
than turnout in [ . . . ] subsequent parliamentary elec-
tions” (Turner 1993, 36). Nevertheless, this conclusion
draws on a very small sample (10 democratic transi-
tions) and short timespans (the first two democratic
elections in each country). Finally, in her 2002 book on
political activism, Pippa Norris briefly mentions voter
turnout trends in newly democratized polities. Draw-
ing upon data from 39 “newer” (mostly third-wave)
democracies but eschewing a theoretical discussion,
she suggests that democratization (i.e., democratic con-
solidation) leads to increases and not declines in voter
turnout (Norris 2002, 56).
In summary, the available empirical evidence is
mixed and lends frail support to the two aforemen-
tioned hypotheses. It suggests that voter turnout de-
clines may occur in only some cases of democratic
consolidation. Such a conclusion is corroborated in this
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article by the systematic overview of voter turnout in
all new democracies between 1939 and 2015. As men-
tioned in the introduction, in almost one-third of the
cases, voter turnout did not decline. Moreover, when
it did, the magnitude of the decline varied widely. This
puzzling variation cannot be explained by the existing
accounts. The next section demonstrates theoretically
that, in order to solve the puzzle of why we see such
variation in voter turnout dynamics, the stakes-based
and disenchantment accounts must be broken down
into two distinct causalmechanisms and combinedwith
a third causal mechanism that is not specific to new
democracies.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES: THREE
CAUSAL MECHANISMS IN NEW
DEMOCRACIES
The existing accounts agree that the uniqueness of
new democracies, in terms of voter turnout, has to
do with the dynamic of regime change, which poten-
tially first increases (democratization stage) and then
depresses (consolidation stage) voting rates. While this
is a perfectly cogent claim, it dodges two theoretical
issues.
The first issue pertains to the baseline level of voter
turnout. If we were to discard the positive effects of
democratization and the negative effects of democratic
consolidation on voter turnout, what level of turnout
would we see? The logical answer, embraced by this
article, is that the baseline voter turnout level is the
turnout level that would be observed if no regime
change were in progress. In other words, the base-
line electoral participation level in new democracies
is determined by the factors at play in the rest of the
democratic world, where democracy is established and
regime change is but a distant memory.
Political science literature clearly shows that, in es-
tablished democracies, the strongest predictors of voter
turnout are political (e.g., margin of victory), insti-
tutional (compulsory voting) and socio-demographic
(population size) factors, which create positive and
negative incentives for participation. According to
most extensive analyses, these classic voter turnout pre-
dictors can explain between 60 and 90% of the cross-
national and over-time variance (Blais 2000; Gray and
Caul 2002; Franklin 2004). Numerous empirical studies
confirm that these effects are consistent across demo-
cratic nations (see Geys 2006; Blais 2007; Stockemer
2016 for overviews). They can be weakened or magni-
fied, to a limited extent, by another set of factors: citi-
zens’ attitudinal characteristics (political interest, sense
of civic duty, or political efficacy). These other factors,
which have substantially weaker effects on aggregated
voter turnout (Franklin 2002, 151), vary not only across
countries but also, in the mid- to long-term, over time.
This temporal variation is due to processes such as
generational replacement. According to the dominant
explanation in the scientific literature, it is these fac-
tors that are responsible for the observed progressive
voter turnout decline in established democracies (see
below). Drawing on these findings, the present article
postulates that the baseline level of voter turnout, from
which voter turnout in new democracies increases or
decreases, and which I refer to in this article as the
standard voter turnout rate, is largely determined by
the classic voter turnout predictors and, to a minor
extent, by citizens’ attitudinal characteristics.
The second theoretical issue that is not addressed by
the existing accounts of voter turnout in new democra-
cies is their degree of compactness. Are the increases
and decreases in voter turnout that occur during de-
mocratization and democratic consolidation necessar-
ily part of a single, indivisible, causal mechanism? Or
can these dynamics be driven, at least in some cases,
by only one of the two stages of regime change, that
is, by either democratization or democratic consoli-
dation, but not both? This article answers this ques-
tion with a resounding “yes,” thereby breaking down
the existing accounts in favor of two distinct causal
mechanisms. Distinguishing between these two sepa-
rate mechanisms is necessary since, as the following
paragraphs show, each mechanism represents a con-
ceptually different source of decline, is independent
from the other mechanism, and is driven by different
causal factors.
The Mobilizing Mechanism
The first mechanism I discuss, the mobilizing mech-
anism (see Graph A1 in Figure 2), is well reflected
in both the stakes-based hypothesis and the first part
of the disenchantment hypothesis. It refers to factors
that augment voter turnout at democratization but that
vanish at the consolidation stage. For example, revo-
lutionary euphoria or an uncertain election outcome,
particularly when the fate of the regime is at stake, may
boost citizens’willingness to participate in the founding
democratic election. This enthusiasm increases voter
turnout above its standard level, that is, the counterfac-
tual rate that would be observed had there been no de-
mocratization. However, later on in the consolidation
process, the mobilizing factors are no longer present,
causing the “democratization bonus” (i.e., the positive
differential between the actual and unobserved stan-
dard turnout rates) to disappear. Following this line of
thought, explaining post-democratization turnout de-
cline hinges on accounting for variation in the initial
mobilization phase of the founding election.
The degree of initial electoral mobilization is likely
to reflect the democratization context, which I suggest
is made up of two principal factors. The first is the way
the democratic transition occurred (i.e., the democ-
ratization path). Although there are many different
ways to democratize, the particularly salient element
for examining initial mobilization is how involved the
opposition and citizenry are in the demise of the an-
cient regime. For example, in cases where the regime
surrenders to pressure from the street, we are likely to
see very different initial electoral turnout levels than in
cases where a dictatorship is ended by foreign military
intervention or at the discretion of the authoritarian
4
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FIGURE 2. Illustration of the Causal Mechanisms: Without Any Trend in the Standard Voter Turnout
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ruler(s). I posit that the more that oppositional forces
are involved in the regime change, the stronger the
initial electoral mobilization. This can be attributed
to revolutionary euphoria (i.e., citizens’ increased po-
litical efficacy and social connectedness) and/or high
electoral stakes (i.e., the risk of a victory or return on
the part of the autocrats).
Democratization Path Hypothesis (H1): The higher the
involvement of the opposition in the democratic regime
change, the stronger the participation bonus in the found-
ing election.
The second type of contextual factors that may in-
crease participation in the founding election relate
to the voting act itself. Many scholars agree that
voting is essentially a habit (Campbell et al. 1960,
92; Plutzer 2002; Gerber, Green, and Shachar 2003;
Franklin 2004). Hence, the way that elections were
conducted before democratization may help deter-
mine democratic electoral participation behavior. The
more electorally mobilized that citizens were in the
non-democratic period, the more they are socialized
into voting, and the more likely they are to partic-
ipate in the first democratic elections. These indi-
viduals face few administrative and practical obsta-
cles to voting (e.g., registration is automatic and/or
even the least educated people know the voting
procedure), and there are good reasons to partici-
pate (the stakes seem high). However, because par-
ticipation in democratic elections is not the same
as participation in the context of non-democratic
forcedmobilization, the founding democratic elections
may start a period of electoral re-socialization, dur-
ing which citizens discover the role of the voting act
in democratic politics (Franklin 2004, 199). As a re-
sult of this re-socialization process, people may either
continue participating or cease doing so, depending
on their experience with and interpretation of the
democratic political developments. A substantial share
of these people, especially those with fewer socio-
economic resources, are likely to find democratic pol-
itics too complex and/or of little salience to their per-
sonal lives. Given the absence of electoral compulsion,
they will decide to stop participating in the electoral
process and thus contribute to the voter turnout de-
cline.
Non-Democratic Electoral Mobilization Hypothesis (H2):
The stronger the degree of electoral mobilization before
democratization, the higher the turnout rate in the found-
ing elections.
The Demobilizing Mechanism
The second causal mechanism that may be responsible
for voter turnout dynamics in new democracies is the
demobilizing mechanism (see Graph A2 in Figure 2).
This mechanism accounts for the second part of the
disenchantment hypothesis. It also captures the impact
of factors that depress turnout, are absent at the start
of democratic regime change, and then intervene dur-
ing the consolidation process (i.e., the democratic con-
solidation context). Most typically, this demobilizing
mechanism acts to decrease turnout below its “stan-
dard” level if citizens become dissatisfied with the re-
ality of democratic politics. In other words, dissatisfac-
tion is nonexistent at time 1 (democratization), but it
emerges at time 2 (consolidation), which, all else being
equal, results in a declining turnout trend. Although
the demobilizing and mobilizing mechanisms operate
in opposite directions, they can both be in play at dif-
ferent points in time in a single case of regime change.
The combination of these two factors may account for
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particularly strong post-democratization voter turnout
declines (see Graph A3 in Figure 2).
As outlined above, many studies assume that
democratic consolidation always tends to depress
voter turnout. This proposition is not theoretically
implausible if one accepts that the appeal of democracy
is based, to some extent, on an illusion (Schumpeter
1942, 264), which few people realize before living in a
democratic polity themselves. Even though real-world
democracies—or polyarchies, to quote Robert Dahl
(1971)—are superior to autocracies in many respects
(Przeworski et al. 2000), they lag considerably behind
the democratic ideals that most people envision when
participating in the demise of dictatorship and the es-
tablishment of democratic rule (Huntington 1991, 255,
263). When people realize that democracy is a not a
panacea for all social and economic problems and that
the power of the people to affect decision-making is
limited, their political efficacy and their willingness to
vote will decrease. Because of this psychological mech-
anism, decreasing voter turnout tendencies might be
inherent to anydemocratic consolidation and shouldbe
observable once the effects of the classic voter turnout
predictors and initial mobilization are taken into ac-
count.
The Democratic Illusion Hypothesis (H3): Since citizens’
democratic disenchantment is an inherent element of
democratic consolidation, voter turnout tends to decrease
after democratization.
However, democratic consolidation disenchantment
may not be driven solely by the psychological mech-
anism. It may also depend on the realities faced by
citizens in new democracies. The worse the new regime
performs, especially in economic terms, the stronger
citizens’ disenchantment, and thus the decline in voter
turnout should be even greater. Conversely, if the new
regime performs well, disenchantment and turnout de-
cline may be limited or even nonexistent. Here, econ-
omy is considered to be a valence issue, where the
desirable property is overall economic prosperity.
The Democratic Regime Performance Hypothesis (H4):
The worse the economic performance of the new demo-
cratic regime, the greater the decline in voter turnout.
The Standard Voter Turnout Rate
In addition to the mobilizing and demobilizing mech-
anisms, which are specific to new democracies, there
is a third potential source of voter turnout variation:
the standard voter turnout rate. This is a function of
classic voter turnout predictors and citizens’ character-
istics, and it is a main contributing factor to setting the
voter turnout rate in established democracies. Unless
it remains stable or varies randomly, then it, too, may
have a significant effect on the voter turnout dynamics
in new democracies. If it follows a negative trend, as
illustrated by graphs B1, B2, and B3 in Figure 3, it
would reinforce the depressing effect of the mobiliz-
ing and/or demobilizing mechanisms. In contrast, if the
trend of the standard rate is positive (Graphs C1, C2.
and C3 in Figure 3), it could partly or entirely offset the
effects of demobilization. If neither the mobilizing nor
the demobilizing mechanisms are at work in a country,
then the direction of the voter turnout trend is, as in
established democracies, entirely responsible for the
post-democratization voter turnout dynamic.
From this point of view, it is important to remem-
ber that, in established democracies, voter turnout
has been declining since the 1970s or 1980s. Most
scholars attribute this to changes in citizens’ char-
acteristics and generational replacement (Miller and
Shanks 1996; Lyons andAlexander 2000; Putnam 2000;
Wattenberg 2003; Blais, Gidengil, and Nevitte 2004;
Wass 2007; Blais and Rubenson 2013; for a more nu-
anced picture see Franklin 2004; Gallego 2009; and
Konzelmann,Wagner, andRattinger 2012). Because of
technological, economic, social, and geopolitical trans-
formations, citizens across the globe have become in-
creasingly more educated, better able to decode the
political game, andmore demanding vis-a`-vis their gov-
ernments (Inglehart 1990; Dalton 2000; Klingemann
and Dalton 2007; Norris 2011; Klingemann 2014).
These “critical citizens” (Norris 2011) or “dissatisfied
democrats” (Klingemann 2014) have also been increas-
ingly exposed to the failures and deficiencies of the
political sphere thanks to the development of inves-
tigative journalism, private media, and technological
advances such as the Internet.
The shifts in citizens’ cognitive skills and the amount
of information at their disposal weaken the appeal of
ideologies and strengthen citizens’ independence from
political parties, trade unions, and social groups (Knut-
sen 2007). More importantly, these global factors also
seem to have affected citizens’ attitudes towards po-
litical engagement, rendering the conventional forms
(including electoral participation) less appealing and
raising interest in non-conventional forms of participa-
tion, such as demonstrations or boycotts (Dalton 2000,
933; Inglehart andCatterberg 2002; Norris 2002;Mayer
2010, 282).
These changes in the global context, particularly ris-
ing education levels, also greatly contributed to the
Third Wave of Democratization, which began in 1974
(Huntington 1991, 65; Welzel and Inglehart 2006).
Moreover, some micro-level studies find that the at-
titudinal and generational patterns pertaining to polit-
ical participation that exist in established democracies
are present in third-wave new democracies, as well
(Coffe´ and van der Lippe 2010; Chang 2012). Con-
sequently, there is reason to expect that voter turnout
(i.e., the standard voter turnout rate) in newdemocratic
regimes may follow trends similar to those observed
in more established democracies. Actually, when the
data on voter turnout in new democracies presented in
Figure 1 are reorganized by democratization wave (see
Figure 4), there is a clear tendency for voter turnout to
decline after 1974, but the same cannot be said of pre-
1974 turnout levels. Besides global shifts in political
culture or in classic predictors of turnout, these chang-
ing patterns may, of course, also translate to changes in
the causal mechanisms specific to new democracies. In
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FIGURE 3. Illustration of the Causal Mechanisms: With Negative and Positive Trends in the
Standard Voter Turnout Rate
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particular, if citizens in new democracies are increas-
ingly critical and demanding, they may be more sus-
ceptible to post-democratization disenchantment. The
following empirical analyses examine these eventuali-
ties.
CASE SELECTION AND DATA
In order to test the proposed hypotheses empirically,
I built an exhaustive database of legislative elections
held in the contexts of democratic consolidation be-
tween the Second World War (1939) and the present
(2015), the period for which reliable data was avail-
able. The database was collected thanks to the elec-
toral results handbooks compiled by Dieter Nohlen
and his colleagues (Nohlen, Krennerich, and Thibaut
1999; Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann 2001; Nohlen
2005; Nohlen and Sto¨ver 2010), which I updated with
other sources on more recent elections.3 In line with
the aforementioned conceptualization of democratic
consolidation, the database contains the first six demo-
cratic elections to the lower house of parliament (or
constitutional assembly) for each new democracy. The
main variable of interest is the voter turnout rate, ex-
pressed as a percentage of registered voters.
Regarding the operationalization of democratic
transitions, it is based on the overall polity score in
the Polity IV project (version 2015), which is a widely-
used tool in political science research to assess regime
change.4 Polity scores vary from -10 (full autocracy) to
+10 (full democracy). My case selection is as inclusive
as possible: any shift from negative to positive numbers
(or to zero) qualifies as a democratic transition.5 I have
also added all new democratic countries—mostly for-
mer colonies—that do not exist in the Polity IV dataset
prior to their independence. At the same time, because
democratic transitions are sometimes short-lived and
because we are interested in democratic consolidation
turnout dynamics, only democracies that endured for
at least 3 elections are included in the analysis. In the
end, the database contains a total of 91 democratic
transitions and 494 elections.6 A list of these countries
and their elections, as well as summary statistics for
all variables introduced below, can be found in the
Supplemental Materials.
This article performs two main empirical analyses.
The first analysis focuses on the first part of themobiliz-
ing mechanism (H1, H2) and studies the participation
3 www.electionguide.org, www.ipu.org, www.idea.int, http://
africanelections.tripod.com, http://psephos.adam-carr.net, accessed
in November 2012 (for elections through 2011) and in January 2017
(for elections after 2011).
4 It is worth noting that a few small countrieswith a population below
500,000 in 2006 are not coded by Polity and are thus excluded from
the analysis (Marshall 2016: 4).
5 The findings reported below are also robust to alternative cut-
points (see the Supplemental Materials).
6 If countries record several democratic periods interrupted by au-
thoritarian intermezzos or coups (e.g., Thailand), each uninterrupted
democratic period that lasts three elections counts as a separate
consolidation period and is indicated by Roman numerals (e.g.,
Thailand I, Thailand II). No country has experienced more than
two such periods since 1939.
bonus in the founding democratic election. The second
analysis models the dynamics of voter turnout in the
first six democratic elections, and, in addition to assess-
ing the impact of the participation bonus (H1, H2), it
explores the presence of the demobilizing mechanism
(H3, H4).
ANALYSIS 1: THE DEMOCRATIZATION
STAGE
Methods
In accordance with the proposed theory, the democra-
tization participation bonus studied in the first analy-
sis is the difference between the actual voter turnout
rate (observed in the founding democratic election)
and the standard turnout rate that would be expected
in an election held in an established democracy with
the same characteristics as the nascent democracy at
hand. To estimate the participation bonus, I compiled
an additional dataset of elections held in established
democracies, that is, countries that have been demo-
cratic for at least 20 years and meet high democratic
standards (Polity 6), using the same sources as those
used for new democracies. This dataset contains 453
elections held in 65 countries after 1939.7 The found-
ing elections from the 91 democratic consolidations are
added to this dataset. I then analyze the data through
a generalized least squares (GLS) regression analysis
using the classic voter turnout predictors (see below)
as control variables. The participation bonus is given by
the coefficient of a dummy variable Founding Election,
which corresponds to the difference in turnout rate
between a new and an established democracy if all
other voter turnout predictors are held constant.
TheDemocratization PathHypothesis (H1) is tested
via six dummy variables that correspond to different
modes of democratic regime change. The constant
represents the turnout rate for the elections in es-
tablished democracies. The six modes of democratic
regime change are based on an updated version of the
classic typology by Samuel Huntington (1991, 114).8 I
sort countries into the following categories: Replace-
ment (regime change brought about by opposition
forces), Transplacement (a pact between opposition
and government), Transformation (transition initiated
by government forces),Adverse Intervention (domestic
dictatorship terminatedbyhostile external forces),For-
eign liberation (foreign occupation terminated by allied
external forces) and Decolonization (regime change
resulting from independence).9 The Democratization
7 Since voter registration figures are particularly problematic in the
United States (McDonald and Popkin 2001), the United States is not
included.
8 Huntington’s typology was mostly supposed to characterize the
third wave democratizations that occurred between 1974 and 1991,
and so it does not fit all the transitions in the present dataset. There-
fore, one of Huntington’s categories (intervention) was split into two
groups (adverse intervention and foreign liberation), and another
category (decolonization) was added.
9 The classification of different transitions is based on careful com-
parison of multiple sources that are presented in the Supplemental
Materials.
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Path Hypothesis presumes that turnout in the found-
ing elections should vary as a function of the involve-
ment of opposition forces in the transition process.
This means that the highest turnout rates should be
observed after replacements, while the lowest turnout
rates (i.e., no democratization bonus) should be
observed after internally-induced regime change
(transformations).
The Non-Democratic Electoral Mobilization Hy-
pothesis (H2) asserts that electoral mobilization in
the authoritarian era leads to higher voter turnout
in the founding democratic elections. To test this
hypothesis, a dummy variable (Authoritarian Mobi-
lization) was constructed for all countries that held
elections in the 5 years preceding the transition and
displayed voter turnout rates higher than 80%, that
is, higher than the long-term average observed in es-
tablished democracies in the second half of the 20th
century (Blais 2007, 624). This condition is met by 25
of the 91 founding elections in the dataset.10 It should
be noted that both authoritarian mobilizations and
bottom-up regime changebecamemuchmore common
in the post-1974 era.11 If these two factors prove to
be sources of post-democratization declines in voting,
then they are at least partly responsible for the differ-
ence between pre-third-wave and third-wave democ-
racies shown in Figure 4.
I control for three aforementioned types of classic
voter turnout predictors: institutional, political, and
socio-economic (Geys 2006, Blais 2007, Stockemer
2016).12 The first institutional factor is the type of polit-
ical regime: parliamentary or (semi-)presidential. If the
country’s president is directly elected in a separately-
held election, this reduces the salience of legislative
elections and, therefore, voter turnout (Pacek, Pop-
Eleches, and Tucker 2009). I operationalize this via
dummy variables (Semi-)Presidential (directly elected
presidencies = 1) and Concurrent (simultaneous pres-
idential and legislative elections = 1). Voter turnout
tends to be higher when voting is compulsory and
when the electoral compulsion is enforced (Fornos,
Power, and Garand 2004). The dummies Compulsory
and Compulsory Enforced are respectively coded as
one when voting is explicitly compulsory by law, and
when sanctions for abstention exist and are enforced, at
least sporadically. In Western democracies, more pro-
portional electoral systems are associated with higher
voter turnout because they incentivize citizens to vote
and motivate parties to mobilize voters (Stockemer
2015). This is operationalized via the continuous vari-
ableADM (averagedistrictmagnitude: total number of
10 Benin and Mali are not included even though they nominally
fulfil the criterion of 80% turnout, since their authoritarian regimes
clearly did not achieve such participation levels. See the Supplemen-
tal Materials for a thorough discussion of these cases and a full list
of mobilized dictatorships.
11 Before 1974, 16%of democratizationswere opposition-driven (re-
placements or transplacements), and 12% resulted from mobilized
dictatorships. After 1974, these figures shifted to 47% and 33%,
respectively.
12 Most of these data come from the same sources as the voter
turnout data (see the Supplemental Materials).
seats divided by the total number of electoral districts).
I also control for the legal voting age (Voting Age), as
its reduction contributed to voter turnout decline in
established democracies (Franklin 2004).
Political factors comprise Competitiveness (the dif-
ference in the vote share between the party with the
highest percentage of votes and the party with the
second-highest percentage of votes) and Decisiveness
(the absolute value of the difference between 50% of
the votes and the vote share of the party with the high-
est percentage of votes). The greater these values, the
less competitive (in terms of party competition) or de-
cisive (in terms of policy outcomes) elections should be,
depressing voter turnout (Franklin 2004). In terms of
socio-economic factors, I include the natural logarithm
of the size of the electorate in millions (Electorate Size)
and the natural logarithm of the gross domestic prod-
uct, measured in 1990 Geary–Khamis dollars (GDP).
While the former should decrease turnout by diluting
the importance of one’s vote (Blais 2000), the latter
should increase voter turnout by raising citizens’ liter-
acy and improving the conditions inwhich elections are
conducted (Blais 2007). The analysis also includes re-
gional dummies (Africa,Asia,Latin America,Oceania,
and North America, with Europe serving as the refer-
ence category) to control for geographic and cultural
specificities.13 Decade dummies (reference: 1990s) al-
low for period effects; I expect that they will reflect the
post-1970s declining trend reported by previous studies
(see above).
Finally, given the time-series, cross-sectional nature
of the data, it is necessary to be aware of four poten-
tial sources of statistical bias: unit heterogeneity, au-
tocorrelation, contemporaneous correlation, and non-
stationarity (Wilson andButler 2007). To deal with unit
heterogeneity, the usual approach in the social sciences
is to apply fixed effects (Allison 2009). Nevertheless,
the time-invariant nature of the main variables of in-
terest (dummies in Hypotheses 1 and 2) and the data
structure (for each new democracy, the number of time
pointsT= 1) preclude the use of such a “within”model.
Instead, I follow Pacek, Pop-Eleches, and Tucker’s
study (2009) and use a random effects model. I show in
the Supplemental Material that the results are robust
to a range of alternative modeling strategies.14 In ad-
dition, statistical tests suggested the presence of serial
correlation (but neither contemporaneous correlation
nor non-stationarity) in the data.15 As the data are
13 Given the results of Analysis 2 below, I also tested a post-
Communist dummy for founding elections in post-Communist
democracies. Its coefficient was statistically insignificant and did not
alter the findings in Model C.
14 I tested these alternatives: ordinary least squares (OLS) regression
of averaged data (T = 1 for both established and new democracies),
a “hybrid”GLSmodel (Allison 2009), Prais-Winsten regression with
panel-corrected standard errors, andpooledOLSwith clustered stan-
dard errors. See the Supplemental Materials.
15 The tests were applied to subsets of the data where T > 1. The
presence or absence of serial correlation was identified with the test
suggested inWooldridge (2010) (H0 = no first-order autocorrelation,
p < 0.001), non-stationarity by Fisher-type tests discussed in Baltagi
(2008) (H0 = panels are non-stationary, p < 0.001), and contempo-
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TABLE 1. Voter Turnout Rates in the Founding Democratic Elections
A B C
Founding Elections 6.74 (2.07)∗∗
Replacement (H1) 12.23 (2.95)∗∗∗
Transplacement (H1) 6.92 (3.33)∗
Transformation (H1) − 2.84 (3.10)
Adverse Intervention (H1) 6.23 (3.04)∗
Foreign Liberation (H1) 5.10 (3.98)
Decolonization (H1) − 2.83 (4.51)
Authoritarian Mobilization (H2) 12.28 (3.15)∗∗∗
Closeness − 0.10 (0.05)∗ − 0.09 (0.04)∗ − 0.09 (0.05)∗
Decisiveness − 0.12 (0.08) − 0.14 (0.07)∗ − 0.14 (0.07)+
(Semi-)Presidential System − 4.01 (1.93)∗ − 4.13 (2.09)∗ − 4.83 (2.00)∗
Concurrent Elections 7.82 (1.97)∗∗∗ 6.29 (1.88)∗∗∗ 6.43 (1.78)∗∗∗
Compulsory 8.74 (2.30)∗∗∗ 9.24 (2.28)∗∗∗ 9.64 (2.30)∗∗∗
Compulsory Enforced 9.05 (2.00)∗∗∗ 7.37 (1.76)∗∗∗ 7.94 (1.75)∗∗∗
ADM − 0.00 (0.02) 0.02 (0.02) − 0.00 (0.01)
Voting Age − 1.17 (0.67)+ − 1.21 (0.62)∗ − 1.24 (0.60)∗
Electorate Size (ln) − 1.44 (1.09) − 2.43 (1.10)∗ − 2.63 (0.99)∗∗
GDP (ln) 6.28 (1.58)∗∗∗ 3.97 (1.42)∗∗ 4.44 (1.34)∗∗∗
1940s 14.10 (4.24)∗∗∗ 10.74 (3.85)∗∗ 11.51 (3.86)∗∗
1950s 11.97 (3.93)∗∗ 8.96 (3.58)∗ 9.67 (3.58)∗∗
1960s 11.43 (2.74)∗∗∗ 9.19 (2.46)∗∗∗ 9.67 (2.46)∗∗∗
1970s 7.19 (1.36)∗∗∗ 5.75 (1.26)∗∗∗ 6.13 (1.28)∗∗∗
1980s 4.28 (0.80)∗∗∗ 3.43 (0.78)∗∗∗ 3.62 (0.79)∗∗∗
2000s − 3.93 (0.99)∗∗∗ − 3.37 (0.97)∗∗∗ − 3.26 (0.98)∗∗∗
2010s − 4.93 (1.15)∗∗∗ − 4.07 (1.21)∗∗∗ − 4.02 (1.21)∗∗∗
Continent Dummies Yes Yes Yes
Constant 37.56 (13.18)∗∗ 65.09 (12.75)∗∗∗ 60.50 (12.74)∗∗∗
Observations 453 533 533
R2 0.57 0.51 0.55
+p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. Elections in established
democracies serve as the reference category in models B and C.
cross-sectionally dominated (the number of units G >
T), I address this problem by using clustered standard
errors (Wooldridge 2010, Section 13.8.2).
Results
The result of the first empirical analysis is reported
in Table 1. The baseline model, Model A, includes
only elections held in established democracies (453)
and classic voter turnout predictors. Model B incor-
porates 80 founding democratic elections (N = 533).16
Finally, Model C tests Hypotheses 1 and 2. It is impor-
tant to note that, in all three models, the regression
coefficients of most classic voter turnout predictors re-
main in the expected direction. For instance, turnout
rates are higher when voting is compulsory or when
there is another simultaneously held election. Con-
versely, they are lower in less developed countries or
large electorates.17 The decade dummies show that, as
raneous correlation with the test presented in Pesaran (2004) (H0 =
no contemporaneous correlation, p = 0.48).
16 Eleven founding elections are not included in the analyses because
of missing data on some of the independent variables.
17 Given the geographically varied composition of the data, the in-
significant coefficient of ADM is congruent with the earlier finding
expected, voter turnout started declining around the
1970s.18
Model B supports the common wisdom that democ-
ratization is associated with unusually high citizen par-
ticipation. On average, voter turnout in founding elec-
tions is higher by approximately 6.7 percentage points
than in “normal” democratic contests. However, the
next model shows that this common wisdom needs
to be refined. As suggested by Hypothesis 1, the de-
mocratization bonus tends to vary depending on the
democratization path and, in particular, on the involve-
ment of the opposition. When the regime change is
entirely (replacements) or partially (transplacements)
driven by the opposition forces, the bonus is the high-
est (12.2 and 6.9 pp, respectively). Conversely, when
the involvement of the opposition is not decisive in the
that that the effect of electoral systems is different in non-western
democracies (Stockemer 2015).
18 According to the post-estimation Wald test, and in contrast to the
difference between the 1960s and 1970s (p = 0.02), the difference
between the 1940s and 1950s is not statistically significant (p= 0.19).
To guarantee that the results are not affected by the progressive
expansion of the pool of established democracies, I replicatedModel
A for seven democracies that consolidated by the early 1940s and
for 21 democracies that consolidated before the mid-1970s. Both
replications confirmed the declining trend observed in Table 1.
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democratization process, the rise in voter turnout in the
founding elections is weaker or insignificant. In partic-
ular, in democratizations safely controlled by the au-
thoritarians (transformations), no participation bonus
is observed.
The second hypothesis (H2) related to the mo-
bilizing mechanism is also supported. In transitions
from authoritarian regimes that conducted elections
and mobilized their citizens to participate, turnout in
the founding democratic elections is approximately
12.3 pp higher than in “normal” democratic elections,
regardless of the democratization path. Consequently,
in replacements from mobilized dictatorships, the es-
timated value of the democratization bonus is nearly
24.5 pp. If the democratization bonus predicts voter
turnout declines, then this has important implica-
tions for understanding voter turnout dynamics in new
democracies. This is explored in the second empirical
analysis, in which the estimated democratization bonus
becomes one of the predictors.19
ANALYSIS 2: THE CONSOLIDATION STAGE
Methods
The second empirical analysis models the post-
democratization dynamic of voter turnout in the first
six democratic elections. As the main interest now lies
in turnout dynamics and the data structure allows it
(T > 1 for all units), I apply fixed effects.20 Since
statistical tests indicate the presence of autocorrela-
tion (but not of contemporaneous correlation or non-
stationarity),21 I report clustered standard errors.How-
ever, various alternative model specifications give the
same substantive results (see Section D in the Supple-
mental Materials).
To complete the test of the first two hypotheses (H1
and H2), which involve the mobilizing mechanism, the
estimation of the democratization participation bonus
from the first empirical analysis (i.e., the regression co-
efficients related to different forms of transitions and
degrees of authoritarian mobilization) now becomes
one of the predictors. It is important to note that fixed
effects preclude including dummy and slowly changing
variables in the model (Beck 2011). On the other hand,
it is possible to interact such variables with normally
19 As the mobilizing mechanism pertains only to the positive effects
of the democratization context, the Democratization Bonus variable
takes into account only the effects of replacements, transplacements,
adverse interventions, and foreign liberation. It attributes a value
of zero to transformations and decolonizations, whose regression
coefficients are substantively weak and statistically insignificant. This
theoretically driven choice has no effect on the substantive findings
of Analysis 2.
20 This choice is driven mainly by the theory and the research ques-
tion, since the Hausmann test (Hausmann 1978), which examines
whether there is a systematic difference in the coefficients between
the fixed and random effects specification (in which case the former
would be preferred), is not entirely conclusive (p > 0.06).
21 The same tests as in Analysis 1: Wooldridge 2010 (p = 0.06),
Baltagi 2008 (p< 0.001), and Pesaran 2004 (p= 0.69). As in the case
of the Hausmann test, I adopt a conservative interpretation of the
Wooldridge test and apply clustered standard errors.
changing variables, which is important for my theory.
The corollary of the theoretical propositions developed
above is that the dynamic of regime change is the
strongest at the beginning of democratic consolidation
and weakens over time. Therefore, Democratization
Bonus (and other variables below) is interacted with
a time-changing variable called Election Sequence that
varies inversely with the election number and ranges
from –1 to 0. Accordingly, the impact of the Democra-
tizationBonus will be the strongest for the first election
(for which the bonus is multiplied by –1) and nonex-
istent for the sixth election (for which it is multiplied
by 0). The values of Election Sequence are negative
purely for ease of interpretation, since positive values
of the Democratization Bonus are supposed to reduce
voter turnout.
As for the predictors that correspond to the demo-
bilizing mechanism, a non-interacted form of the Elec-
tion Sequence variable is used to test the Democratic
IllusionHypothesis (H3).TheDemocraticRegimePer-
formance Hypothesis (H4) is operationalized with the
continuous variable Economic Growth, which mea-
sures the average annual economic growth (in per-
centage points of GDP) since the last election.22 To
control for potential temporal or regional variation in
Hypotheses 3 and 4, I tested the interactions of their
respective operationalizations with the dummy vari-
able Third Wave (coded as one (1) for countries that
democratized after 1974) and with regional dummies.
In the full model specification, I also include the time-
varying control variables from Analysis 1: Closeness,
Decisiveness, ADM, Electorate Size, and GDP.
Results
The results are presented in Table 2. All models
strongly support Hypotheses 1 and 2, indicating that
the democratization bonus contributes to declines in
voter turnout. The regression coefficient is always in
the hypothesized direction (i.e., negative), substantial,
and highly statistically significant. Its value remains rel-
atively close to -1, which means that, in the processes
of democratic consolidation, voter turnout gradually
decreases by approximately the same amount by which
it was increased by the democratization context in the
founding election.
As for the Democratic Illusion Hypothesis (H3), it
is clearly not supported. Once the initial mobilization
(Models D-F) and other factors (Model G) are con-
trolled for, democratic consolidation as such does not
depress voter turnout. On the contrary, the coefficient
of Election Sequence is positive, which means that, be-
fore 1974, voter turnout even tended to increase after
democratization.
For post-1974 consolidations, Election Sequence
must be added to its interaction with the Third Wave.
In Model F, this interaction is negative, and it is
22 For the founding elections, I take the average annual growth
over the preceding four years. An additional test (interaction with
a dummy created for founding elections) did not find that pre-
democratic economic growth has a different effect on voter turnout.
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TABLE 2. Voter Turnout Rates in the First Six Democratic Elections
Model D E F G
Democratization Bonus∗
Election Sequence (H1, H2) − 1.09 (0.22)∗∗∗ − 0.98 (0.22)∗∗∗ − 0.68 (0.23)∗∗ − 0.72 (0.22)∗∗
Election Sequence (H3) 0.62 (1.95) 0.66 (1.97) 3.78 (2.51) 5.82 (3.61)
Economic Growth (H4) − 0.29 (0.10)∗∗ − 0.23 (0.09)∗ − 0.23 (0.09)∗
Third Wave ∗ Election Sequence − 5.57 (3.28)+ − 5.46 (3.34)
Post-Communist ∗ Election Sequence − 6.93 (4.08)+ − 7.75 (3.79)∗
Closeness − 0.03 (0.06)
Decisiveness − 0.27 (0.07)∗∗∗
ADM 0.00 (0.01)
Electorate Size (ln) − 2.20 (2.55)
GDP (ln) − 2.10 (2.83)
Country Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Constant 67.93 (0.79)∗∗∗ 68.64 (0.89)∗∗∗ 68.29 (0.84)∗∗∗ 94.52 (24.77)∗∗∗
Observations 494 454 454 449
R2 0.77 0.79 0.80 0.82
+p < 0.10, ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001. Clustered standard errors in parentheses. The non-interacted versions of the
Democratization Bonus, Third Wave and Post-Communist are absorbed by the fixed effects.
substantively and statistically significant. This suggests
that, like in established democracies, there is a differ-
ence between the pre-1974 era, which was more con-
ducive to participation, and the post-1974 era. How-
ever, the combination of the interaction (Third Wave ∗
Election Sequence) with the main term (Election Se-
quence) yields only a weakly negative coefficient (-1.8)
that is statistically insignificant (p = 0.46). Moreover,
when the time-variant controls are added (Model G),
the combined coefficient becomes (slightly) positive
(0.4). This reveals that the (insignificant) decline ob-
served in Model F can be accounted for by shifts in
the standard voter turnout rate. There is no evidence
that democratic consolidation has a specific effect that
depresses electoral participation. Theonly exception to
this general finding concerns post-Communist democ-
racies.23 In those countries, voting rates tended to de-
cline by 7.4 percentage points in addition to the contri-
bution of the democratization bonus.
The Democratic Regime Performance Hypothesis
(H4) is also invalidated, since the coefficient of Eco-
nomic Growth is in the wrong direction and of little
substantive meaning. The model indicates that, in a
country with an average GDP growth (2% for the
dataset), turnout tended to decrease (not increase, as
hypothesized) by a relatively negligible amount, rang-
ing between 0.58 (Model E) and 0.46 (Model F and G)
percentage points.24
The results of the second analysis, which were tested
for robustness on various subsets of the data (see the
Supplemental Materials), are graphically summarized
in Figure 5. The figure displays the predicted voter
23 The other interactions of Election Sequence with regional dum-
mies proved neither substantially nor statistically significant. See
Section D in the Supplemental Materials.
24 None of the interactions between Economic Growth and regional
or Third Wave dummies were statistically significant.
turnout rates for maximal and zero values of the de-
mocratization bonus based on Model G. In addition,
I plot an estimation of the voter turnout standard
rate, which corresponds to an out-of-sample prediction
of voter turnout combining the characteristics of new
democracies (those studied in the second analysis) and
the regression coefficients from established democra-
cies (replication of Model A in the first analysis).25 It
amounts to the level of voter turnout that would be
expected in any established democracy with the same
characteristics as the new democracies.
Figure 5 clearly shows that, after democratization,
the presence and magnitude of the voter turnout de-
cline depends on the mobilizing mechanism. If voter
turnout is not boosted in the founding elections (the
democratization bonus is zero), then the consolida-
tion process as such does not depress electoral par-
ticipation, and voter turnout rates oscillate around the
standard voter turnout rate. This corresponds to an
increasing trend in pre-1974 new democracies and a de-
creasing trend in post-1974 new democracies. This once
again suggests that, when democratization and consol-
idation dynamics are controlled for, voter turnout in
new democracies follows an evolution similar to that
observed in established democracies.26 At the same
25 For each election in new democracies i, the prediction Ŷi corrre-
sponds to:
Ŷi = established +
∑J
j=1  j established ∗ Xji
The predictors Xj are the same as in Model A. Since my analy-
sis suggests that, in post-Communist democracies, the demobilizing
mechanism is at play (voter turnoutmaydeclinebelowwhatwouldbe
expected in other countries), the estimation of the coefficients from
consolidated democracies excludes 17 elections held in countries
with a communist past (N = 436 instead of 453).
26 The weight of the factors that contribute to this dynamic (classic
voter turnout predictors and, presumably, citizens’ characteristics)
may differ. Table 2 shows that, in new democracies, the change in
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FIGURE 5. Predicted Voter Turnout Dynamics in New Democracies
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Note: The figure examines only new democracies for which data are available from all the first six democratic elections (18 pre-1974,
22 post-1974 and 17 postcommunist democracies).
time, the figure corroborates the exceptionality of post-
Communist democracies. By the sixth election, their
voting rates sankwell below the standard voter turnout
rate. Thus, the demobilizing mechanism warrants fur-
ther investigation in these cases, which I discuss below.
Together, these findings deconstruct the difference be-
tween post-1974 and pre-1974 voter turnout rates, as
shown in Figure 4. There is no evidence that, in the
third wave of democratization, voter turnout declines
became more frequent because of democratic consol-
idation. Except for in post-Communist democracies,
turnout tended to decline because of different de-
mocratization contexts (i.e., more frequent opposition-
driven democratizations and mobilized dictatorships)
and change in factors that are not specific to new
democracies.
CONCLUSION
The present article draws on the most exhaustive em-
pirical material to date on voter turnout dynamics in
new democracies. Scrutinizing all cases of democratic
consolidations between 1939 and 2015, it challenges
the currently held expectation in political science that
the process of democratic consolidation automatically
triggers a voter turnout decline. Voter turnout declines
in newdemocracies appear to be almost entirely a func-
tion of what happens before regime change, not what
happens afterwards. These declines occur in countries
in which the democratization process is driven by the
opposition and in which the previous regime required
the voter turnout trend that started around the 1970s is due to a
combination of variables measuring time (Third wave ∗ Election
Sequence) and the classic voter turnout predictors. In established
democracies, time variables indicate a declining trend even when
controlling for the classic voter turnout predictors (see Analysis 1).
a strong degree of electoral mobilization. According
to my interpretation, these factors boost voter turnout
above the standard voter turnout rate in the founding
elections. Thus, the voter turnout rate in founding elec-
tions is above the level that would be expected in an
established democracy with the same characteristics.
After the founding elections, however, these effects
vanish, which makes voter turnout decline progres-
sively to the standard level.
It is true that, since the 1970s, voter turnout de-
clines have become more frequent in consolidating
democracies, regardless of the initial mobilization in
the founding elections. Nevertheless, this is a tendency
that new democracies share with established democ-
racies and that, presumably, reflects well-documented
global changes in democratic politics and citizens’ char-
acteristics. Moreover, when the usual predictors of
voter turnout are controlled for in new democracies,
the shift brought by the third wave of democratization
moves from a positive turnout trend to no trend (rather
than to a decline). Ultimately, with the exception of
post-Communist democracies, there is no evidence that
democratic consolidation depresses voter turnout.
Post-Communist democracies are the only new
democracies in which voter turnout declined below
the standard rate and, thus, where democratic con-
solidation, not just unusually high initial mobiliza-
tion, may have depressed voter turnout. However,
the concrete causal mechanism in these cases re-
mains unknown. Existing studies on the region have
found little explanatory power in the factors through
which consolidation is usually expected to depress
turnout, such as widespread corruption (Kostadinova
2009), economic disenchantment (Pacek, Pop-Eleches,
and Tucker 2009) and dissatisfaction with democ-
racy (Kostelka 2015). The findings of this article in-
vite researchers to pay more attention to alternative
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explanations that may complement the democratic
consolidation accounts.
One possible explanation relates to post-Communist
citizens’ attitudinal and value characteristics. If these
characteristics are particularly unfavorable to voting
and date back to the communist era (Mishler and Rose
1997; Bernhagen and Marsh 2007; see also Kostelka
2014, 959–961), then it may be that the standard rate
in the post-Communist region is simply lower than
elsewhere in the world. This would imply that the mo-
bilizing mechanism is responsible for an even larger
share of the post-Communist decline. Another alter-
native explanation pertains to voter registration. In
most post-Communist democracies, voter registration
is automatic, inclusive (based on population registers),
and lifelong. In contrast to countries such as Canada
or France (let alone the United States), practically all
citizens remain eligible to vote, even when abroad, and
are counted in the official voter turnout rates through-
out their adulthood. Moreover, many post-Communist
democracies are located near rich Western countries,
and these Western democracies attracted a large num-
ber of immigrants frompost-Communist countries dur-
ing the post-Communist consolidation period. Accord-
ing to some estimates, East-West migration accounts
for several percentage points of the post-Communist
decline (Coms¸a 2015; Kostelka 2017). Future research
could use this article as a departure point and include
these factors in a comprehensive study of the post-
Communist voting rates.
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIALS
To view supplementary material for this article, please
visit https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055417000259.
Replication files will be found on Dataverse at
https://doi.org/10.7910/DVN/MYSRXT as of Septem-
ber 1st, 2017.
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